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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
Right to Trial by Jury-Fines and "Special Costs"
When the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held in State
v. Henderson' in March, 1986, that defendants are entitled to jury trials
in DWI cases, it was easy to predict that the supreme court would grant
the State's request for a writ of review. The issue required prompt and
definitive review producing a decision applicable statewide.
Chief Judge Redmann's fourth circuit opinion reasoned that DWI
defendants are statutorily entitled to jury trials, because the "special
costs" (i.e. a drivers license reinstatement fee, a $50.00 fee to defray
cost of supervision or jail, a $50.00 fee for the cost of chemical tests
for intoxication) imposed by the legislature in addition to the maximum
fine of $500.00 made the offense one for which "a fine in excess of
five hundred dollars" may be imposed. Thus, under article 779 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the offense was necessarily triable by a
jury of six persons. Judge Redmann treated the "special costs" as a
part of the "punishment" assessed for the conviction, and therefore,
as a part of the "fine" for purposes of determining the statutory right
to jury trial. The issue, of course, concerned the meaning of the term
"fine" as used in article 779.
The supreme court correctly held that the term "fine" is used by
the legislature to describe the monetary penalty set forth in the statute
defining the sanction, and is distinguished from and does not include
"costs." '2 The idea that the term "fine" is to include all statutorily
provided adverse fiscal consequences which result from conviction se-
riously misconstrues the meaning of that term. Judges and lawyers clearly
recognize the distinction between "fines" and "costs."
There is no doubt a possible danger that the legislature could exploit
this distinction by imposing heavy financial consequences on convicted
defendants and enumerating them as "costs." Hopefully, this will not
occur. Nevertheless, were this to occur, the supreme court would have
to address more directly a second point raised by Judge Redmann in
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 485 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
2. State v. Henderson, 491 So. 2d 647 (La. 1986).
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his opinion in Henderson. Judge Redmann also expressed the theory
that DWI is a "serious offense" because of financial and other adverse
consequences flowing from a DWI conviction. While he avoided pur-
porting to "hold" that DWI defendants have a Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial, because the maximum "fine" exceeds $500.00 and because
serious collateral consequences result from conviction, his discussion
leaves little doubt that he would agree with such a position.
In reversing the fourth circuit,3 Justice Calogero correctly and wisely
avoided definitive treatment of the very sensitive problem of drawing
the "jury trial line" in terms of adverse financial effects. Writing for
the majority, Justice Calogero simply recognized the basic legislatively
intended distinction between fines and costs and merely held that article
779 does not statutorily require a jury trial if the maximum "fine" does
not exceed $500.00, even though additional special costs do create the
possibility that the required expenditures flowing from a conviction may
exceed $500.00.
Justice Calogero pointed to the rather clear lack of a "bright line"
for ascertaining the Sixth Amendment right to a jury based on possible
"monetary assessments" resulting from conviction.4 The period of six
months imprisonment, on the other hand, is a "bright line" in both
the Louisiana Constitution and the federal jurisprudence.5 It appears
clear that the Louisiana Supreme Court does not view the mere fact of
exposure to adverse monetary consequences exceeding five hundred dol-
lars as triggering the federal constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. 6
Whether this case will pave the way for judicial approval of leg-
islation increasing the fine limits in article 779 is by no means evident.
The rationale of Henderson neither approves nor precludes such a move.
Amendment of Sentences by Courts of Appeal
The continuing "skirmishing" over the duty and prerogative of the
courts of appeal to correct sentences which do not conform to mandatory
leglislative guidelines may finally have come to an end. Prior to State
v. Jackson,7 courts were divided on the question of their authority and
duty to recognize and correct sentences which failed, for example, to
3. Id.
4. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 2178 (1975).
5. La. Const. art. i, § 17; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S. Ct. 1886
(1970).
6. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968). La. Const. art.
I, § 17 does not provide for a right to jury trial based on any amount of fine. The
"$500.00 fine" rule is found solely in La. Code Crim. P. art. 779.
7. 452 So. 2d 682 (La. 1984).
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deny parole eligibility in cases of armed robbery.' Some courts viewed
the error as "patent" and therefore, under Code of Criminal Procedure
article 920 (2), within the scope of appellate review, even without an
objection in the trial court or an assignment of error filed by the state
on appeal.
In acting to "correct" the sentences, courts of appeal were evidently
serving as guardians of the legislative mandate when the prosecutor
failed to act to protect the state's interest in the strict application of
mandatory sentencing provisions. On the other hand, some courts felt
that correcting unobjected to error on a defendant's appeal in a manner
which adversely affected the defendant was inappropriate and served to
"chill" the exercise of appellate rights.
In Jackson, a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Lemmon, the
supreme court denied the courts of appeal the authority to correct
sentences unless the prosecution had properly raised the issue in the
trial court. 9 The court's holding seemed to be based on a theory that
Code of Criminal Procedure article 882 allows only the trial court to
amend an illegal sentence, despite the normal restrictions otherwise pro-
hibiting amendment of sentence. The court in Jackson also alluded to
the "chilling effect" of appellate amendments on the defendant's exercise
of his right to appeal.
While Jackson was before the supreme court, the legislature amended
article 882 to provide explicitly that illegal sentences can be amended
by courts of appeal.' 0 This writer wrongly predicted that courts of appeal
would ignore the amendment, because Jackson seemed to be based on
constitutional principles."
Instead, the courts of appeal quickly divided on the amendment's
effect. In State v. Fraser, 2 the first circuit, en banc, concluded that
Jackson had been legislatively overruled. Judge Lanier's very thorough
and scholarly opinion canvassed the issues and concluded that no sta-
tutory or constitutional limits prevented appellate courts from noticing
and correcting illegally lenient sentences. Judge Lanier, writing for the
majority of the circuit judges, concluded that the proper course was to
remand if correcting the sentence would impose a more severe sentence
than would be minimally required by the statute. Otherwise, the appellate
8. See State v. Jimmerson, 432 So. 2d 1093 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); State v. Davis,
463 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985); State v. Holmes, 462 So. 2d 286 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1984); State v. Liddell, 463 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985); State v. Marien,
457 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
9. 452 So. 2d at 684.
10. 1984 La. Acts No. 587, § I.
!1. See Joseph, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Post Conviction Procedure,
45 La. L. Rev. 485, 493 (1984).
12. 471 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
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court should simply amend the sentence to bring it up to minimum
requirement. '"
The supreme court granted writs in Fraser and reversed.14 Justice
Lemmon, again writing for the court, held his Jackson position by a
four to three margin. The majority concluded that the amendment -to
Code of Criminal Procedure article 882 required a proper trial court
objection before an appellate court could consider the correction. The
court found "no codal or statutory authority for an appellate court to
search the record for patent sentencing errors to the detriment of the
only party who sought review."" The court held fast to the principle
that "a sole appellant's position should not be worsened" by his bringing
an appeal. 16
The supreme court also based its decision on what it perceived to
be the "proper allocation of functions between the appellate court and
the prosecutor."' 7 Justice Lemmon expressed concern that "the ap-
pearance of an impartial judiciary" would suffer if the appellate court
interposes itself into the role of protecting the state's interest.' 8 This,
as Justice Lemmon pointed out, is properly the duty of the prosecuting
attorney as the advocate representing the state.
Justice Lemmon's carefully crafted opinion avoids pronouncements
of constitutional law. As in Jackson, he construed legislatively ordained
appellate procedures in light of "time-honored procedural rules."' 9
Hopefully, the legislature will be satisfied that the state's interest
in enforcement of mandatory penalties can be adequately protected by
the district attorney who is, after all, charged by the Louisiana Con-
stitution with the ultimate responsibility for enforcement of criminal
laws. 0
An even more important implication of Fraser, particularly when
read in light of Jackson,2' and which is discussed later in this article,22
is the theory that the trial court may be empowered to sentence without
compliance with "mandatory" features of sentencing legislation if the
prosecution expresses its tacit approval by failing to object. The sentence,
13. See Joseph, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Criminal Trial and Post Con-
viction Procedure, 46 La. L. Rev. 445, 458 (1986).
14. State v. Fraser, 484 So. 2d 122 (La. 1986).
15. Id. at 124.




20. La. Const. art. 5, § 26.
21. 452 So. 2d 682 (La. 1984).
22. See discussion accompanying infra notes 75-88.
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if unobjected to and unappealed, becomes a final judgement and a
"legal sentence" from a de facto perspective. 23
Two theories support the view that such sentences are "legal." First,
presumably the trial court will sentence without compliance with man-
datory features and the prosecutor will acquiesce in such a sentence
only if in their judgment a sentence which does comport with mandatory
requirements would be "excessive" and, hence, prohibited by the Lou-
isiana Constitution. 24 Second, if the decision to invoke sanctions is a
constitutional prerogative of the prosecutor, and the prosecutor fails to
invoke those sanctions, then the sanctions do not apply. In an analogous
context, Justice Calogero in Jackson employed this theory to hold that
the mandatory sentencing features of the Code of Criminal Procedure
article 893.1 were not to be applied without action by the prosecutor. 25
Burden of Proof in Cases of Self Defense
The Louisiana Supreme Court faces one of the most interesting
questions posed by the 1942 Criminal Code's redefinition of the crime
of murder in connection with the issue of the burden of proof in cases
of self defense. The jurisprudence places the burden on the state to
disprove self defense; that is, the state must negate the defense by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self de-
fense. 26 The cases can be traced back to the pre-code era when the
mental element of murder was the common law's "malice aforeth-
ought." 27 Clearly, at common law, a self defensive state of mind was
inconsistent with "malice."1 2 Thus self defense defeated the state of
mind required for murder. In proving that the defendant killed with
"malice," the State had to show that his action was not in self defense.
Pre-code Louisiana decisions, such as State v. Ardoin, 29 clearly reflect
this theory.
23. In Fraser, Justice Lemmon said:
It is the prosecutor's duty to protect the state's interest in obtaining adequate
sentences, and the criminal justice system suffers no detriment from the appli-
cation of time-honored procedural rules which require the parties, and not the
appellate court, to complain of some dissatisfaction with the judgment of the
lower court in order to obtain any favorable change in the judgment on appeal.
484 So. 2d at 125.
24. La. Const. art. I, § 20, which provides that "[njo law shall subject any person
to ... excessive ... punishment," requires judicial review of sentences imposed in
particular cases. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
25. See discussion accompanying infra notes 75-88.
26. For an excellent discussion of the burden of proof in homicide and non-homicide
cases, without resolving the issue, see Justice Calogero's opinion in State v. Freeman,
427 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1983).





In defining murder as a "specific intent" killing, the legislature
eliminated the inconsistency between a defendant having an "active
desire" to kill (or inflict great bodily harm)3 and nevertheless believing
reasonably that such killing is necessary to save himself (or another).3 2
The two states of mind (specific intent and self defense) can coexist
without the prior inconsistency.
Nevertheless, Louisiana courts, following the enactment of the 1942
Criminal Code, continued to cite the pre-code cases for the proposition
that the state must negate self defense when the issue is "raised" by
the evidence. 3
Recently, in State v. Cheatwood, 4 Justice Lemmon, in an extensive
footnote, outlined the theoretical distinction between defenses which
defeat essential elements of offenses and those which negate culpability,
"despite the state's proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the essential
elements." 3 For example, intoxication and mistake of fact are cate-
gorized under the first group, because they are "element defeating"
defenses. On the other hand, the justification defenses of articles 18
through 22 in effect add a "mitigatory factor" which eliminates culp-
ability despite proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all essential elements
of the offense. These latter defenses are "culpability defeating" as
opposed to "element defeating."
The Cheatwood footnote concludes that, in such cases of true af-
firmative defenses, the legislature intended only to require the State to
carry the burden of proving the elements of the offense and to require
the defendant to prove the mitigatory factor. The footnote correctly
refers to the State's "constitutional and statutory burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."13 6 The statutory law does not require
the state to disprove exculpatory circumstances. 7
30. See La. Crim. Code art. 30, enacted by 1942 La. Acts No. 43. See also La.
R.S. 14:30.1(1) (1986), as amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 74.
31. The "specific intent killings" defined in La. R.S. 14:30 (1986) and La. R.S.
14:30.1(1) (1986) require the State to prove that the offender acted with a specific intent
to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Specific intent is defined by La. R.S. 14:10 (1986)
in terms of an offender acting with an "active desire" to produce certain criminal
consequences.
32. La. R.S. 14:19 (1986) and La. R.S. 14:20(1) (1986) set forth the statutory defenses
of self defense.
33. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 427 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1983).
34. 458 So. 2d 907 (La. 1984).
35. Id. at 910 n.4.
36. Id.
37. The pertinent text of this footnote is as follows:
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281
(1977), the Court said:
"[TIhe Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
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This position becomes the rationale for Judge Wicker's opinion in
State v. Barnes, in which the fifth circuit affirmed a conviction for
aggravated battery. 8 In Barnes, the trial court instructed the jury that
"the burden of proving that the use of force or violence is justified in
non-homicide cases is on the defendant and need only be established
by a preponderance of the evidence.3 9
Judge Wicker's opinion is carefully written and thoroughly analyzes
the issues. He has squarely presented the Louisiana Supreme Court with
the issue of legislative intent to allocate the burden to the defendant.
The issue of the constitutionality of such a legislative allocation is also
a critical issue and is pending before the United States Supreme Court
doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which
defendant is charged. Proof of the non-existence of all affirmative defenses has
never been constitutionally required .... " 97 S.Ct. at 2327.
Except in a few specific instances, such as La.R.S. 14:63 (trespassing), La.R.S.
14:69 (possession of stolen property) and La.R.S. 14A14 (insanity), Louisiana
statutory criminal law does not directly address the burden of proof for "de-
fenses". Nevertheless, there is a logical distinction between those defenses which
actually defeat an essential element of the offense and those defenses which
present exculpatory circumstances that defeat culpability, despite the state's proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of all the essential elements. In the first category
are defenses such as intoxication (La.R.S. 14:15) and mistake of fact (La.R.S.
14:16), which preclude the presence of a mental element of the offense. When
such defenses are raised by the evidence, the state must overcome the defense
by evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the mental element
was present despite the alleged intoxication or mistake of fact. Otherwise, the
state would fail to meet its constitutional and statutory burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense charged. La. Const.
Art. I § 16 (1974); La.C.Cr.P. Art. 804; La.R.S. 15:271. However, defenses
such as justification (La. R.S. 14:18) are truly "affirmative" defenses, because
they do not negate any element of the offense. Compare United States v.
Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832 (2nd Cir.1983) with State v. Burrow, 293 Or. 691, 653
P.2d 226 (1982); see also Model Penal Code, Proposed First Draft No. I, §
1.12(2) (1961).
It is logical to conclude that the Legislature intended to require the state to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt only the elements of the offense and to require
defendant to prove by preponderance of evidence the exculpatory circumstances
constituting the "affirmative" defense. See W. Lafave & A. Scott, Criminal
Law § 8 (1972). The statutory provisions setting forth the state's burden of
proof refer only to the requirement that the state prove the elements of the
crime-not that the state disprove the exculpatory circumstances constituting
defenses which defeat criminal culpability despite proof of the presence of all
elements of the offense. See La.R.S. 15:271; La.C.Cr.P. Art. 804; former
La.C.Cr.P. Arts. 263 and 387 (1928). See also State v. Freeman, 427 So.2d
1161 (La. 1983), Lemmon, J., concurring.
458 So.2d at 910.
38. 491 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 44.
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at the time of this writing in Martin v. Ohio. 40 The writer predicts that
the United States Supreme Court will uphold such an allocation of the
burden for those states with statutory schemes in which self defense
defeats no elements of the offense. The Louisiana Supreme Court will
eventually have to decide whether the Louisiana Legislature intended
such a result. Justice Lemmon's Cheatwood footnote and Judge Wicker's
application of that theory certainly make sense. Nevertheless, the leg-
islature may indeed have intended to require the State to shoulder the
full burden of proof regarding the culpability of the accused. The court
must decide whether the legislature meant to require the State not only
to prove all elements of the offense, but also to prove the non-existence
of mitigating factors which, if present, will lower or eliminate the level
of culpability.
Firearm Sentencing Statutes
In a series of cases handed down on December 2, 1985,"1 the supreme
court settled many issues regarding the application of the two Louisiana
firearm sentencing statutes. In State v. Jackson, 42 the "lead case" of
the series, the court announced the critical distinction between Louisiana
Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 14:95.2 and Code of Criminal Procedure
article 893.1. The court, overruling State v. Roussel,4 held that La.
R.S. 14:95.2 creates a substantive criminal offense of firearm use during
the commission of enumerated felonies. 4 Code of Criminal Procedure
40. 21 Ohio St. 3d 91, 488 N.E. 2d 166, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1634 (1986).
41. State v. Jackson, 480 So. 2d 263 (La. 1985); State v. Kennedy, 480 So. 2d 299
(La. 1985); State v. Delcambre, 480 So. 2d 294 (La. 1985); State v. Harris, 480 So. 2d
281 (La. 1985); State v. Hogan, 480 So. 2d 288 (La. 1985); State v. Street, 480 So. 2d
309 (La. 1985); State v. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273 (La. 1985).
42. 480 So. 2d 263 (La. 1985).
43. 424 So. 2d 226 (La. 1983).
44. La. R.S. 14:95.2 (1986) provides:
A. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, any person
who uses a firearm or explosive device at the time he commits or attempts to
commit the crime of second degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated battery,
simple kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson,
attempted aggravated rape, attempted first degree murder, or attempted aggra-
vated kidnapping shall upon conviction serve a term of two years imprisonment
for the first conviction and upon conviction for each second and subsequent
offense listed in this Section, he shall serve a term of five years imprisonment.
B. The penalty provided herein shall be in addition to any other penalty imposed
under the provisions of this Title and such person shall serve the additional
term of imprisonment in the same manner as provided in the offense for which
he was convicted and without benefit of parole, probation, suspension of sentence
or credit for good time and any adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence
shall not be suspended.
C. The prison terms provided under the provisions of this Section shall run
consecutively to any other penalty imposed upon conviction of any of the crimes
listed in this Section.
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article 893.1 defines firearm use during the commission of a felony as
an aggravating factor for sentencing.4" Thus, if the prosecution intends
to utilize La. R.S. 14:95.2, "firearm use" must be charged in the
indictment, because it is an essential element of a criminal offense defined
under La. R.S. 14:95.2. On the other hand, article 893.1 may be invoked
by filing pretrial notice without charging firearm use in the indictment.
The distinction stems from the fact that article 893.1 does not define
a new offense, but rather sets forth a "sentencing factor" or "sentencing
element" which, if established by the State, effectively limits the trial
court's discretion by mandating imposition of a severe minimum sen-
tence.
In a footnote,46 the supreme court recognized that the constitution-
ality of establishing such a "sentencing factor" was before the United
State Supreme Court in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.4 7 Justice Calogero,
writing for the court, correctly anticipated the result in McMillan, in
which the United State Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute,
similar in many respects to Louisiana's. 48 In McMillan, the Court rec-
ognized the authority of the legislature to define the essential elements
of an offense without including sentencing factors which may result in
the imposition of a more severe sanction. McMillan established that
such "sentencing elements" may properly be proven to the judge at a
post-conviction proceeding utilizing a "preponderance" standard of proof.
The statute at issue in McMillan, like Code of Criminal Procedure article
893.1, provided a sentencing procedure which did not increase the max-
imum sentence, but set forth a mandatory minimum.
Jackson requires that the prosecutor provide the defendant with a
written pretrial notice of intent to invoke the mandatory sentencing
provisions of article 893.1. The court noted that such a notice is "not
foreign to our criminal procedure," 49 referring to the notice requirement
set forth in State v. Prieur° (notice of intent to offer evidence of
uncharged crimes). Like the "Prieur notice," the firearm sentencing
45. La. Code Crim. P. art. 893.1 provides:
When the court makes a finding that a firearm was used in the commission of
a felony and when suspension of sentence is not otherwise prohibited, the court
shall impose a sentence which is not less than: (I) The maximum sentence
provided by law, in the same manner as provided in the offense, if the maximum
sentence is less than five years, or (2) Five years, in the same manner as provided
in the offense, if the maximum sentence is five years or more.
Imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended'and the offender
shall not be eligible for probation or parole.
46. 480 So. 2d 263, 269 n.10.
47. 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1986).
48. 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
49. 480 So. 2d 271 n.14.
50. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
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notice must be filed "within a reasonable time before trial"' , and must
describe the act of firearm use.
The "reasonable time before the trial" requirement is easy to com-
prehend. This gives the defendant an opportunity to prepare to raise
whatever defenses he may have to the "firearm use" charge at sentencing.
The notice also alerts him to sentencing consequences which may flow
from conviction by trial or guilty plea. Requiring that the notice be in
writing and furnished to the defendant is a simple requirement which
eliminates questions about the content of the notice and whether the
defendant was aware of the State's intent to invoke the statute.
The notice requirement can certainly be satisfied by personally serving
the defendant with a copy of the notice. Hopefully, mailing a copy of
the notice to defense counsel with a certificate from the prosecutor
certifying such mailing will also be acceptable, at least if the notice and
certificate are also filed in the record of the proceedings. Obviously,
the court was not required to define with inalterable precision the details
of its notice rule.
The court alluded to the consitutional requirements of "fair notice"
but did not hold in Jackson that the procedures announced are con-
stitutionally required.52 In the subsequent case of State v. Allen, the
court held that the notice requirements are mandated by state and federal
"constitutional due process principles."" Although the notice procedure
could have been grounded on supervisory powers, 4 the court obviously
preferred to base it on constitutional grounds.
The most significant result of the notice requirement is that it
confirms the implication of the earlier case of State v.Coleman" that
51. The court said:
Although our concerns in this case are not the same as those in Prieur, the
need for pre-trial notice to facilitate a more certain and fair administration of
criminal procedure exists in both. The Prieur notice consists of a written state-
ment, describing the act which the state intends to offer into evidence, furnished
the defendant within a reasonable time before trial. Similar notice of the use
of a firearm enhancement statute would enable defendant to prepare for his
post-trial pre-sentence opportunity to dissuade the trial judge's "finding" that
a firearm was used and, just as importantly, alert him timely to the consequence
of a guilty plea.
480 So. 2d at 271 n.14.
52. The court said: "We conclude that this pre-trial written notice ... is not compelled
by a need to vindicate the sixth amendment's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of an accusation nor by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause." 480 So.
2d at 271.
53. State v. Allen, No. 85-K-2304 (La. Oct. 20, 1986). See also State v. Shows, 488
So. 2d 992 (La. 1986).
54. The court certainly has the authority in exercising its supervisory powers to specify
a procedure which is "consistent with the spirit" of the constitutional requirements of
fairness. See La. Const. art. 5, § 5 (I); La. Code Crim. P. art. 3.
55. 465 So. 2d 709 (La. 1985).
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the decision to invoke the provisions of article 893.1 rests within the
constitutional prerogative of the prosecutor . 6 In Jackson, Justice Cal-
ogero clearly stated that the provisions of article 893.1 are "neither self
operative nor imperative absent the district attorney's . . . timely moving
for enhancement of sentence." 51 7 Thus, without formal pre-trial prose-
cutory action, the trial court can not impose a sentence under article
893.1. After Coleman, some courts had held that the trial court was
neither required to nor prohibited from sentencing under article 893.1
if the prosecution failed to make a request . 8 Following Jackson, the
option to invoke is not in the hands of the judge, but is exclusivley
left to the prosecutor.5 9
Actually the most significant additional sanction not available to
the sentencing court absent a formal notice is the power to deny parole
eligibility. Defendants sentenced under article 893.1 are not eligible for
parole. Even without article 893.1, the sentencing judge can refuse to
grant probation and can impose a sentence of five years (or the maximum
sentence if that is less than five years). The ability to deny parole is
therefore the only feature lost to the trial court if the prosecution fails
to invoke article 893.1.60
Another significant effect of the firearm sentencing cases is the
supreme court's clear recognition that stiff mandatory sentences for
felonies committed with firearms may be excessive if extenuating cir-
cumstances exist. 6' For example, suppose that a seventy-five year old
man with no prior criminal record is convicted of aggravated battery
of a younger "tough" who had previously threatened him. Suppose that
the old gentleman shot the "tough" in the buttocks as the young man
fled when the older man pulled his pistol, thereby clearly eliminating
self defense. A five year non-parolable sentence of imprisonment would
56. La. Const. art. 5, § 26. See also Shows, 488 So. 2d 992.
57. 480 So. 2d at 267.
58. See State v. Collins, 470 So. 2d 549 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985); State v. Wade,
470 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
59. In Jackson, the court said: "Absent such pre-trial notice, the penalty enhancement
provision contained in Art. 893.1 shall not be applied." 480 So. 2d at 271 (emphasis
added). See also Shows, 488 So. 2d 992.
60. The supreme court has not decided whether the trial court may deny parole
eligibility for the entire sentence or for five years of the sentence if the prosecution
invokes article 893.1. See Jackson, 480 So. 2d at 265 n.3, 270 n.11. See also Shows, 488
So. 2d 992; Allen, No. 85-K-2304.
61. In State v. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273, 280 (La. 1985), the court said:
Mandatory sentences generally fall within the Legislature's prerogative to de-
termine the length of the sentence imposed for crimes classified as felonies.
State v. Prestridge, 399 So. 2d 564, 582 (La.1981). On the other hand, the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment will override
a legislatively imposed mandatory minimum sentence if, as applied to a given
defendant for a given crime the punishment is constitutionally excessive.
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be inappropriate and probably excessive, even though mandated by article
893.1. Thus, even if the prosecutor moves timely for article 893.1 en-
hancement, the trial court must still evaluate the circumstances to decide
whether imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence without parole
would be constitutionally excessive. The supreme court has by no means
implied that mandatory sentences are immune from judicial scrutiny.
Retroactivity of Jackson
The supreme court held in Jackson that the newly announced notice
requirement for Code of Criminal Procedure article 893.1 will be given
only prospective application to cases "which are tried after the date of
this opinion" (Dec. 2, 1985), unless the defendant can show he was
"prejudiced." 62 However, less than a year after Jackson, in Allen,63 the
court held that the notice rule of Jackson should be applied to all cases
pending on direct appeal.
The court in Jackson also said that the requirement that La. R.S.
14:95.2 be included in the indictment would be given partially retroactive
treatment. 64 Nevertheless, since the court has recognized that "firearm
use" under La. R.S. 14:95.2 is an element of an offense, full retroactivity
may be required. Otherwise, the state will be permitted to sustain a
conviction for an offense in which the elements were not proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. 65
Application of Article 893.1 to Felonies Involving Only Criminal.
Negligence
In State v. Barberousse,66 the supreme court upheld the application
of acticle 893.1 to a conviction for negligent homicide. 67 Justices Lemmon
62. 480 So. 2d at 271. See also State v. Delcambre, 480 So. 2d 294 (La. 1985). By
"prejudiced," the court appears to mean that the defendant must show "absence of actual
knowledge." 480 So. 2d at 271.
63. Allen, No. 85-K-2304, slip op. at 7.
64. 480 So. 2d at 268-69. The court said that the decision would be applicable to
cases "which are still subject to direct review ... that is ... which have not become
final upon first appellate review." Id.
65. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits convictions unless
the state proves every element of the offense to the fact finder beyond a reasonable
doubt. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970). See also Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
By permitting the state to utilze La. R.S. 14:95.2 (1986) without requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of "firearm use," the precepts of Winship have been violated. Since
the Winship rule is designed to enhance the "truth finding function," full retroactivity
seems appropriate. Jackson changes the rule of substantive law, not merely procedure,
in overruling Roussel. See Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2827 (1986); United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982). In Allen, Justice Lemmon recognized
this problem in footnote 5. No. 85-K-2304, slip op. at 6. The court in Allen was not,
however, required to deal with the issue.
66. 480 So. 2d 273 (La. 1985).
67. La. R.S. 14:32 (1986). The statute proscribes killing by criminal negligence. La.
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and Watson dissented, expressing their belief that the enhanced man-
datory firearm sentences were not intended for application to "unin-
tentional crimes." Justice Calogero correctly pointed out that no such
limit is found in the statute. Nevertheless, the apparent purpose of the
statute is to deter felons from intentionally using firearms in pursuit of
their criminal schemes. This purpose is not served in applying the statute
to an accidental, although "grossly negligent," discharge of a firearm
which causes death. Hopefully the legislature will correct this inequity.
There seems no reason to impose greater prison terms on criminally
negligent firearm users than on criminally negligent motor vehicle op-
erators.
68
Application of Article 893.1 to Crimes in which Firearm Use is an
Essential Element
In State v. Street, 69 the supreme court refused to permit the state
to invoke article 893.1 in a case involving a conviction for violation of
La. R.S. 14:94 for intentionally discharging a firearm under circum-
stances where death or great bodily harm could forseeably result. The
court reasoned that the legislature described the criminal behavior in
terms of firearms use and therefore "must not have intended that the
identical conduct, use of a weapon, should trigger a more harsh pun-
ishment than that prescribed for the same act." ' 70 The court applied the
"principle of lenity' ' 7 to resolve the issue in favor of the accused. The
court reasoned that the legislature, in enacting penalties for felony
offenses in which an essential element is use of a firearm, chose the
sanction provided in the statute in light of the danger posed by such
firearm use. Thus, the legislature must not have intended for article
893.1 to apply to crimes in which use of a firearm is an essential
element.
The writer agrees with Judge Yelverton's approach in the third circuit
case of State v. Victorian, 2 which was overruled by State v. Street. 71
The illegal use of instrumentalities statute, La. R.S. 14:94, may be violated in
R.S. 14:12 (1986). The defendant accidentally shot his sister to death.
68. La. R.S. 14:32 (1986) provides for a five year maximum prison sentence which
does not prohibit probation or parole. Even La. R.S. 14:32.1 (1986), involving vehicular
killings by intoxicated motorists, is punishable by not less than two nor more than five
years imprisonment with no limitation on eligibility for probation or parole.
69. 480 So. 2d 309 (La. 1985).
70. Id. at 312.
71. Quoting State v. Cox, 344 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1977), the court said: .'Criminal
and penal laws are to be strictly construed and in the absence of an express legislative
intent should be resolved in favor of lenity."' 480 So. 2d at 312.
72. 448 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
73. 480 So. 2d 309 (La. 1985).
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several ways," only one of which is the use of a firearm. It is not at
all illogical to assume that the legislature intended for the mandatory
sentence to apply when commission of that felony is by means of firearm
use. It is difficult to believe, as Judge Yelverton pointed out in Victorian,
that the legislature wished to exclude those crimes directly involving firearm
use as an essential element and to include only felonies in which firearm
use is not an element.
How Mandatory are Mandatory Sentences?
From the series of cases decided recently dealing with so called
"mandatory" sentences," there arises a serious question of how "man-
datory" such sentences actually are.
Three theories emerge which combine effectively to give the trial
court significant latitude in appropriate cases, despite mandatory sent-
encing requirements. The first is the theory that such provisions require
the invocation of the sanction by the exercise of prosecutory discretion;7 6
the second is the theory that such sentences may be unconstitutionally
excessive as applied to an individual case; 77 and the third is the theory
that appellate courts on review should not alter an unobjected to sentence
to the detriment of the appellant. 78
In Jackson and Fraser, the supreme court clearly relied on the
prosecutor's constitutional prerogative to determine how and under what
circumstances to enforce the full range of legislative proscriptions and
sanctions available against individuals.79 Although the district attorney
is the lawyer representing the state, he has a constitutionally recognized
74. The statute proscribes the "intentional or criminally negligent discharging of a
firearm, or the throwing, placing or other use of any article ..., where it is forseeable
that it may result in death or great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:94A (1986) (emphasis
added).
75. State v. Fraser, 484 So. 2d 122 (La. 1986); State v. Jackson, 480 So. 2d 263
(La. 1985); State v. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273 (La. 1985).
76. Jackson, 480 So. 2d 263.
77. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273.
78. Fraser, 484 So. 2d 122.
79. In Jackson, the court said: "[This ruling] is prompted by the need to respect
both the judge's impartial role and the district attorney's constitutional right to control
every prosecution in his district." 480 So. 2d at 271.
In Fraser, the court said:
We also base our decision on the proper allocation of functions between the
appellate court and the prosecutor. We note that the appearance of an impartial
judiciary is not served when an appellate court supplies an objection to the
prosecutor who has not complained that the defendant did not receive the
harshest minimum sentence under the penalty statute. It is the prosecutor's duty
to protect the state's interest in obtaining adequate sentences ....
484 So. 2d at 125.
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power to "settle" the case.80 This power has traditionally been recognized
in the context of the decision to invoke the various available criminal
statutes which may cover a defendant's misbehavior.8' He is not required
to charge an offense which provides for a mandatory sentence. For
example, he can choose to charge a defendant with forcible rape82
(carrying a range of sentences) rather than aggravated rape 3 (carrying
a mandatory life sentence). Similarly, he can choose not to invoke the
mandatory sentencing provisions of article 893.1.84
The second theory probably has the clearest support in the juris-
prudence. As Jackson indicates, the mere existence of a legislative man-
datory sentence does not shield a sentence from constitutional
"excessiveness" review based on the particular facts and circumstances
of the case. The constitutional prohibition against excessive sentences
does not apply only to appellate courts. If the trial court is convinced
that imposition of a mandatory sentence would violate "excessiveness"
principles, then the trial court's duty is to impose the most severe sentence
which can be imposed without being excessive.
If the sentence is less than the legislatively prescribed mandatory
sentence, the prosecutor can litigate the "excessiveness" issue by ob-
jecting and appealing. If no objection and appeal are forthcoming, the
sentence should be deemed to be "legal," because one must logically
conclude that both the state and the trial court found that compliance
with the mandatory sentence requirement would result in an unconsti-
tutionally excessive sentence.8 5
80. See La. Const. art. 5, § 26. The district attorney's complete control over the
disposition of a case is also reflected in La. Code Crim. P. art. 691 which gives him the
power to dismiss without having to seek approval of the court.
81. See La. R.S. 14:4 (1986); La. Code Crim. P. art 61.
82. La. R.S. 14:42.1 (1986).
83. La. R.S. 14:42 (1986).
84. Jackson, 480 So. 2d 263. Following this same line of reasoning, La. Code Crim.
P. art 893, which prohibits granting probation for second felony convictions, is probably
not "self-operative." If the prosecutor does not invoke that provision, the sentencing
judge may choose to ignore it.
There certainly may be a valid basis for distinguishing enhancement provisions found
in the penalty provision of the criminal statute itself from enhancement provisions which
are found in other statutes. The real issue, however, seems to be the prosecutor's con-
stitutionally recognized enforcement prerogatives. Should the public become unhappy with
the manner in which their locally elected district attorney is enforcing the law, the voters
can turn him out of office at the end of his term. La. Const. art. 5, § 26 (A).
85. Since the constitutional prohibition against excessive sentences "outranks" the
legislatively prescribed mandatory sentences, the legislature's only option is to amend the
code of criminal procedure to require the trial court to state for the record at the time
of sentencing why it finds that imposition of a mandatory sentence would be excessive.
Further, the legislature could direct courts of appeal to remand for such a statement or
for resentencing if a non-complying sentence is imposed.
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The third theory deals with the role of the appellate courts and is
closely tied to the two previously discussed theories. As Justice Lemmon
illustrated in State v. Fraser,86 it is well settled that the appellate court
does not alter a judgement on appeal to the detriment of the sole
appellant where the issue is not raised by the other party.8" Justice
Lemmon would not assume that the legislature intended such an anom-
alous result in amending article 882 to provide that an illegal sentence
can be amended on appeal. Thus, absent a prosecutor's timely effort
to seek review, the judgment of the trial court becomes final, and hence
"legal."
Further, as is pointed out in Fraser, the prosecutor, not the court
of appeal, is charged with the duty of protecting the state's right to
insist that the full measure of punishment be levied against the defendant
for his transgressionm
Exhaustion of Peremptory Challenges as Predicate for Showing
Prejudice Based on an Erroneous Refusal to Sustain a Challenge for
Cause
Prior to a 1983 amendment," Code of Criminal Procedure article
800 explicitly provided that the defendant could not appeal the erroneous
denial of a challenge for cause unless he had "exhausted" his peremptory
challenges. The comment to the projet of the Code of Criminal Procedure
explained that this provision was designed to overrule legislatively jur-
isprudence which required a defendant to establish that he was "forced
to accept an obnoxious juror."'  The defendant was not required by
the proposed article 800 to risk antagonizing a juror by challenging him
and then being forced to accept him. The article did require however,
that the defendant expend all of his peremptory challenges before com-
pletion of the panel. Very logically, the code eliminated the obligation
to challenge and be forced to accept, but precluded complaint concerning
the denial of a challenge of cause if the defendant still had remaining
peremptory challenges.
The 1983 amendment eliminated the "exhaustion" requirement. The
purpose for doing so was obviously to speed up the jury selection process.
There was apparently a perception that defense counsel would drag out
86. 484 So. 2d 122.
87. See supra note 23.
88. See supra note 79.
89. 1983 La. Acts No. 181.
90. Project of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, La. State Law Inst., art.
800 Comment (b) (1966). The comment provides that article 800 was designed to overrule
State v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 7 So. 2d 221 (1942). Breedlove imposed the "obnoxiousjuror" requirement. Article 800 was adopted as proposed in the Projet.
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the process in order to exhaust peremptory challenges so that he could
preserve the right to raise complaints about denial of challenges for
cause. Whether there is any empirical basis for that assumption is
certainly beyond the writer's competence to speculate.
In State v. Vanderpool,91 the court confronted a conviction in which
the defendant had a valid complaint concerning the trial court's refusal
to grant a challenge for cause, but completed jury selection with two
remaining peremptory challenges.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Dixon traced the legislative
history and concluded that removal of the "exhaustion" requirement
did not imply that the "harmless error" standard of article 921 was
not applicable. By complying with the "exhaustion" requirement, the
defendant in effect established that he was prejudiced by having to use
one of his peremptory challenges to excuse a juror who should have
been excused for cause. Thus, he was improperly deprived of one of
his peremptory challenges when presumably he needed all of them be-
cause he used all he had available.
In Vanderpool, the court said that the trial court erred in failing
to remove for cause a Deputy Sheriff actively involved in law enforce-
ment.9 2 The deputy was called after ten of the jurors were already seated.
After the improper denial of the defendant's challenge for cause, the
deputy was peremptorily excused. The defendant still had three of his
eight peremptory challenges remaining. He exercised only two more
before completion of the panel.
Despite utilizing the "harmless error" rule to affirm, the court did
not suggest that it is in effect reviving the "exhaustion" doctrine under
the guise of "harmless error." Nonetheless, it is clear from Vanderpool
that the "harmless error" doctrine will be applied in evaluating the
prejudicial effect of denial of challenges for cause, and that failure to
exhaust peremptory challenges is a factor in the "harmless error" equa-
tion.
Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Cases
In Pullin v. Louisiana State Racing Commission,93 the State Police
Racing Investigators Unit conducted a warrantless search of a race track
barn assigned to Pullin. The search produced various controlled sub-
stances and syringes. Possession of such items in the barn was a violation
of the rules governing the conduct of a licensed owner and trainer of
race horses. The evidence was utilized at a hearing before the track
stewards which resulted in Pullin's suspension for three years and the
91. 493 So. 2d 574 (La. 1986).
92. See State v. Simmons, 390 So. 2d 1317 (La. 1980).
93. 484 So. 2d 105 (La. 1986).
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imposition of a $2000.00 fine by the Louisiana State Racing Commission.
The district court affirmed the commission's action, but the court of
appeal reversed. 94 The appellate court found that the evidence was dis-
covered by virtue of an unconstitutional search and was, hence, inad-
missiable in the proceeding to sanction Pullin for misconduct.
The supreme court granted the commission's application for review.
On original hearing the court reversed the appellate court on the theory
that the defendant consented to the search. 9 On rehearing, however, in
a plurality opinion by Justice Marcus, the court found that, although
the warrantless search conducted by the state police violated Pullin's
Fourth Amendment rights, the exclusion of evidence in the civil action
by the State against Pullin did not automatically result.96
Justice Marcus adopted the rationale of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Janis97 and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza." In these
cases, both involving civil actions by the government against an indi-
vidual, the Court balanced the "deterrence" benefits derived from ex-
clusion against the societal cost resulting from the loss of probative
evidence. In assessing the deterrence value of exclusion, the Court con-
sidered whether the "primary objective" of the government agents con-
ducting the unconstitutional search was enforcement of criminal laws or
enforcement of the civil regulatory scheme. To the extent that the
"primary objective" was criminal law enforcement, loss of the evidence
in a criminal action was sufficient deterrent incentive for compliance
with Fourth Amendment standards. Thus, the second societal cost of
exclusion in the civil action by the governmental agency against the
individual will not provide significantly higher deterrent dividends.
Further, in Pullin, the Louisiana Supreme Court evaluated the "cost"
in terms of the significance of the proceedings. Pointing to the state's
"vital interest" 99 in regulating the horse racing industry to prevent
"corrupt, incompetent, dishonest, and unprincipled horse racing prac-
tices,"' 0 the court balanced in favor of admitting the unconstitutionally
seized evidence.
Justices Dennis and Calogero dissented,10' arguing that the evidence
should be suppressed. Both Justices noted that the officers who con-
ducted the unconstitutional search were agents of the same governmental
entity which instituted the civil proceedings. The dissenting Justices were
94. 465 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
95. 477 So. 2d 683 (La. 1985).
96. 484 So. 2d 105.
97. 428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
98. 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
99. 484 So. 2d at 108.
100. Id.
101. 484 So. 2d at 109.
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not convinced that the "primary objective" of the Louisiana State Police
Racing Investigations Unit was enforcement of criminal laws as opposed
to enforcement of the racing commission's regulatory scheme. Thus,
they were satisfied that the "primary objective" was to seize evidence
for use in an adminstrative disciplinary proceeding.
Justices Watson 0 2 and Lemmon,103 for different reasons, would not
have reached the issue. They concurred because they would have reversed
the judgment of court of appeals on other grounds.
The wise approach taken by Justice Marcus does not purport to
adopt an inflexible rule. Rather, his balancing approach can fairly ac-
comodate the often competing values of protecting privacy rights and
admitting reliable evidence.
Certainly, to the extent that the "primary objective" of the gov-
ernment agent's search is enforcement of an administrative scheme,
exclusion will probably be required. Also, if the state's interest in en-
forcement of the admininstrative scheme is rather low, suppression may
result, even if the searching agency's "primary objective" is criminal
enforcement.
Application of Exclusionary Rule to Cases Involving Search Warrants
Issued by Justices of the Peace
In State v. A Minor Child,10 the supreme court affirmed the suppres-
sion by the trial court of marijuana seized under the authority of a
search warrant issued by a justice of the peace. Justice Lemmon, writing
for a unanimous court, traced the history of the authority of the justice
of the peace to issue search warrants. He noted the explicit limitation
in Code of Criminal Procedure article 161 which only permits justices
of the peace to issue search warrants in "those cases specifically provided
by law."
In Minor Child, the state relied on the reference in La. R.S. 40:985
to the "judge or magistrate issuing the warrant" being satisfied that
"probable cause" exists for issuance of the warrant. 05 The supreme
court (as well as the trial judge) correctly found this not to be specific
authorization for issuance of search warrants by justices of the peace,
although they are "magistrates" as defined in Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure article 931(4). The language of La. R.S. 40:985 is very similar
102. 484 So. 2d at 108 (citing original hearing, 477 So. 2d 683).
103. 484 So. 2d at 108.
104. 493 So. 2d 618 (La. 1986).
105. La. R.S. 40:985 (1977) provides: "A search warrant relating to offenses involving
controlled dangerous substances may be authorized to be served at any time of the day
or night if the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant is satisfied that there is probable
cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant."
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to 21 United States Code Section 879,"'1 and United States magistrates
can issue federal search warrants.' °7 Louisiana's uniform controlled dan-
gerous substances law is very similar in many respects to the federal
law and was obviously copied from the federal legislation. Use of the
term "magistrate" in La. R.S. 40:985 is a good example of the confusion
sometimes created by borrowing a term from another statutory scheme
without carefully evaluating the full significance of using such a term.
The most interesting aspect of Minor Child lies in the issue which
was not discussed. In the closing paragraph of the opinion, Justice
Lemmon made reference to the absence of prosecutory assertion of "any
other basis for reversing the judgment suppressing the evidence."' 0 8 This
may be an oblique and pregnant allusion to the issue of the application
of exclusionary policy in such a case.
There are two arguments which the state could have raised but
obviously did not.
The first is that exclusion is only appropriate in instances of vio-
lations of constitutional (as opposed to statutory) rights. Justice Lemmon
recognized this distinction earlier in State v. Bickham.' 9 Indeed, Code
of Criminal Procedure article 703, creating the motion to suppress,
specifically refers to suppression of evidence "on the grounds that it
was unconstitutionally obtained.""10 The comment explains that "[tihe
term 'unconstitutional,' rather than the term 'illegal,' is employed on
the theory that a search and seizure can be 'illegal' if some minor aspect
of search or seizure ... was technically contrary to law even if not
violative of [constitutional rights]."'''
In Minor Child, the supreme court never questioned the utilization
of exclusionary policy to enforce the clear legislative dictate of article
161. Furthermore, there is no hint, as there was in State v. Langlois,"2
106. 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1981) provides:
A search warrant relating to offenses involving controlled substances may be
served at any time of the day or night if the judge or United States magistrate
issuing the warrant is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that
grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time.
107. Rule 41 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "A search
warrant authorized by this rule may be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge of a
state court of record within the district wherein the property or person sought is located,
upon request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government."
(emphasis added).
108. 493 So. 2d at 620.
109. 404 So. 2d 929 (La. 1981).
110. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(A), comment (b).
111. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703, comment (b).
112. 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979). In Langlois, a wildlife agent arrested defendant for
possession of marijuana. The court found that the arrest was unlawful despite the existence
of probable cause. The legislative history of the authority of wildlife agents to arrest
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that the statutory violation might constitute an "unreasonable search"
under article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. There is no
suggestion that a statute authorizing a justice of the peace to issue a
search warrant would violate the state or federal constitutions.
The second argument stems from the so-called "good faith" ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule carved out in United State v. Leon."'
Although Leon has been adopted by several Louisiana courts of appeal," 4
the supreme court has not decided whether Leon's logic applies to the
Louisiana Constitution. Thus, approaching the problem in Minor Child
from the Leon perspective would require the court to decide whether
suppression is appropriate if an officer relies in good faith on a judicial
order. Even if the Leon approach is applicable, arguably no reasonably
well trained officer could reasonably rely on the validity of a search
warrant issued by a justice of the peace." 5
Nevertheless, since the matter was not briefed and argued by the
advocates, Justice Lemmon wisely avoided discussion of the more subtle
issue of exclusionary policy.
reflects a clear legislative intent to limit their arrest powers to wildlife violations and a
list of specifically enumerated offenses. La. R.S. 56:108 (H). The court found that the
agent acted under "color of authority" but lacked authority. The court then made the
sweeping statement that "such an arrest is an unreasonable seizure for the purposes of
Article I, § 5 of our Constitution." 374 So. 2d at 1211. Later in State v. Bickham, 404
So. 2d 929 (La. 1981), the court, in dicta, said:
[Tlhis court in the Patton and Longlois [sic] decisions did not intend to suggest
that all violations of statutory restrictions on arrest will be deemed constitutional
violations under La.Const. Art. I, § 5 (1974). Nor did we intend to extend the
exclusionary rule to include non-constitutional violations of statutes which are
not designed to protect the privacy interests of citizens. When the statutory
limitation (or duty) alleged to have been violated by the officer is not designed
to implement fundamental rights of privacy, this court should not employ the
exclusionary rule as a device to enforce such legislative directives. This is, of
course, particularly true when the facts strongly support a finding that the
officer acted reasonably and in good faith in arguably exceeding the bounds of
his authority.
404 So. 2d at 933.
113. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
114. See State v. Shannon, 472 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); State v. Wood,
457 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); State v. DiMaggio, 461 So. 2d 439 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1984); State v. Ebey, 491 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986). See also State
v. Saddler, 490 So. 2d 1155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), in which the court utilized Leon
and still suppressed the evidence. In Saddler, the court found that the affidavit supporting
the search warrant was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that the policeman who
sought (and obtained) the warrant "should have known" of its deficiency, and hence "it
was not reasonable for him to rely on the warrant once he obtained it." 490 So. 2d at
1157-58.
115. See Saddler, 490 So. 2d 1155.
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Modification of Verdict Based on Jury's Unreasonable Failure to
Find Affirmative Defense
In State v. Lombard,' 6 the supreme court made two very significant
pronouncements. One involves substantive criminal law, and the other
involves criminal appellate procedure.
Lombard and the victim, another high school student, became in-
volved in a heated verbal exchange at an athletic contest. Lombard
obviously provoked the victim (a larger fellow) with taunting words and
obscene gestures. Nevertheless, it was the victim who first exercised
unprivileged force-he walked up a ramp and clearly "threw the first
punch." As Lombard was being beaten, Lombard unsheathed a knife
and fatally stabbed the victim.
The jury was instructed on manslaughter,' 7 self defense"8 and the
aggressor doctrine."19 The jury convicted the defendant of second degree
murder, apparently rejecting his argument that the killing was committed
in self defense or at least in a "heat of blood" following the victim's
provocation.
On appeal, the supreme court relied on State v. Peterson20 for the
proposition that "heat of blood" and "sudden passion" are not elements
of manslaughter; "rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of
a defense which exhibits a degree of culpability less than present when
homicide is committed without them."'' Thus, the court recognized that
the elements of specific intent second degree murder and specific intent
manslaughter are the same: the killing of a human being combined with
a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. 22 If the state proves
116. 486 So. 2d 106 (La. 1986).
117. La. R.S. 14:31 (1986).
118. La. R.S. 14:20(1) (1986).
119. La. R.S. 14:21 (1986).
120. 290 So. 2d 307 (La. 1974).
121. 486 So. 2d at Ill. The court continued:
Since "sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are not elements of the crime,
the state does not bear the burden of proving them. Neither is there a requirement
in our law that these factors be affirmatively established by the defendant.
Instead, the jury is free to infer these mitigatory factors from the evidence.
Thus, a manslaughter verdict is responsive to a second degree murder indictment
even though the record contains no evidence of "sudden passion" or "heat of
blood."
Id. at n.9.
122. La. R.S. 14:30.1(1) (1986) defines specific intent second degree murder as: "[TIhe
killing of a human being ... when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:31(I) (1986) defines manslaughter as:
[A] homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder)
or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden
passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive
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both elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it has proven second degree
murder. For the offense to be manslaughter instead of second degree
murder, the defendant must additionally prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the killing was committed in the "heat of blood"
generated by "adequate provocation." In other words, once the state
proves a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, then the
jury should find manslaughter only if the defendant proves by a pre-
ponderence of evidence that his "hot blooded" desire to kill stemmed
immediately from "adequate provocation." Lombard makes clear the
allocation of burdens.
Lombard also firmly establishes the proposition that the defendant
is entitled to have the judgment reduced to manslaughter if his proof
of provocation and "heat of blood" are so strong that no reasonable
juror could have failed to find the "mitigatory factors" proven by a
preponderance of evidence.
Justice Marcus' carefully reasoned opinion in Lombdrd is thus a
commendable and logical application of the theory of State v. Byrd'
and Code of Criminal Procedure article 821 .124 Lombard, however, is,
in a sense, the other side of the coin.
In Byrd, the evidence did not reasonably support all of the elements
of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, but did support
conviction for a lesser included responsive offense. Thus, the court
modified the verdict to affirm a conviction of the lesser offense because
the elements of the lesser offense were necessarily found by the jury in
convicting for the greater. In Lombard, all of the elements of the offense
were adequately supported by the evidence, but the jury unreasonably
failed to find the mitigatory factors which reduce the level of culpability
without eliminating the presence of essential elements of the offense.' 25
an average person of his self control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not
reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood
had actually cooled, or that an average perons's blood would have cooled, at
the time the offense was committed ....
123. 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980).
124. La. Code Crim. P. art. 821 is a codification of Byrd.
125. The court said:
A preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that defendant committed the
offense in a sudden passion or heat of blood caused by a provocation which
would have deprived an average person of his self control and cool reflection.
No rational trier of fact could have concluded otherwise. Thus, the jury erred
when it found defendant guilty of second degree murder. It should have returned
a verdict of manslaughter. Hence, the trial judge erred in failing to modify the
verdict and render a judgement for the lesser offense. La.Code Crim.P. art.
821(C).
If the appellate court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable
to the state, supports only a conviction of a lesser included responsive offense,
1986]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Lombard approach in effect requires the court to make a finding
not made by the jury. This approach protects defendants from being
prejudiced by a jury's unreasonable rejection of an affirmative defense.'26
The old Louisiana view, reflected in the 1954 decision of State v.
Riviere,'2" that such matters as "heat of blood" and "adequacy of
provocation" are exclusively matters for the jury, is simply not good
law. Under Lombard, a jury's unreasonable failure to find a mitigatory
factor or affirmative defense is reviewable error of law-just as under
Byrd a jury's unreasonable finding of an element is reviewable error of
law.
Closure of Pretrial Proceedings to the Public
In State v. Eaton,' 28 Judge Hall forsaw the direction of the United
State Supreme Court's cases and recognized that the Louisiana Supreme
Court's position in State v. Birdsong' '9 was soon to be overruled. In
Birdsong, the court held that the trial court should close a pretrial
hearing if defendant can show "a reasonable likelihood of substantial
prejudice to his right to a fair trial."' 30 Judge Hall noted that Justice
Lemmon, in his concurrence in Birdsong, would additionally require the
trial court to consider "alternative means of eliminating or minimizing
prejudicial effects" and to set forth for the record his "reasons for
determining that closing the hearing is the only reasonable method. '"''
In Eaton, the trial court closed a hearing (and sealed the record)
on defendant's capacity to stand trial in a highly publicized murder
case. The trial court found that the Birdsong test had been met. The
press applied for a writ of review. The court of appeal reversed and
ordered that the record be unsealed.
the court may modify the verdict and render a judgement of conviction on the
lesser included responsive offense. La.Code Crim.P. art. 821(E). Manslaughter
is a lesser included responsive offense to second degree murder. La.Code Crim.P.
art. 814 (A)(3). Accordingly, in the instant case, the verdict of second degree
murder should be reduced to manslaughter.
486 So. 2d at Ill.
126. See also State v. Roy, 395 So. 2d 664 (La. 1981), reversing a jury verdict for
failure to find that the defendant proved his insanity at the time of the offense by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The writer has praised the courts of appeal for the first and third circuits for approaching
the problem in similar fashion. See State v. Gerone, 435 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1983); Joseph, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Post Conviction Procedure, 44 La.
L. Rev. 477, 482 (1983); State v. Bryan, 454 So. 2d 1297 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984);
Joseph, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Criminal Trial and Post Conviction Pro-
cedure, 46 La. L. Rev. 445, 451 (1985).
127. 225 La. 114, 72 So. 2d 316 (La. 1954).
128. 483 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
129. 422 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1982).
130. Id. at 1138 (emphasis in original).
131. 425 So. 2d 1266 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
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Judge Hall did a masterful and scholarly job of tracing the evolution
of this rapidly developing area of the law and predicting the direction
of the United States Supreme Court.
In Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale,'32 a plurality opinion by former
Justice Stewart, the United States Supreme Court held only that the
Sixth Amendment "public trial right" of the accused provided no right
of access by the press and public to pretrial hearings. Subsequent United
States Supreme Court cases'33 have recognized that the First Amendment
does protect the press' right of access to certain proceedings. Judge Hall
cited later federal appellate decisions 3 4 holding that the First Amendment
provides a right of access to certain pretrial proceedings. Indeed, Judge
Hall recognized in Eaton what would only six months 3 ' later become
the position of the United States Supreme Court in Press Enterprise v.
Superior Court. 3 6
In Press Enterprise, the Court found unconstitutional the California
rule which, like Louisiana's, permitted closure of a pretrial proceeding
upon a showing of "a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice."
The Court held that a higher burden must be met in order to justify
closure of pretrial proceedings which are normally open to the press
and public and whose function is influenced in a positive manner by
public access. The Court said that the pretrial hearing may be closed
"only if specific findings are made demonstrating that first, there is a
substantial probability that defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reason-
able alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's
free [sic] trial rights.' 37
Judge Hall had already adopted essentially the same position in
Eaton.
Jury Instructions-Review of Error without Objection in the Trial
Court
In State v. Green, 31 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury in
132. 443 U.S. 368, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
133. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982); Press Enterprise
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,
104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984).
134. In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d
550 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
135. Eaton was rendered on January 22, 1986. Press Enterprise was decided on June
30, 1986.
136. 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986).
137. Id. at 2743,
138. 493 So. 2d 588 (La. 1986).
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a trial for third offense theft'3 9 that the two prior convictions were
proven only to enhance defendant's sentence exposure and not to prove
the defendant's guilt for the theft currently charged. 4 Although defense
counsel objected to the reading of the allegations of the two prior
convictions to the jury, he did not request a limiting instruction. He
relied instead on the argument that the prior convictions were not
elements of the offense, but rather were only sentencing factors.',4 When
the trial court overrruled his objection, he stipulated to the prior con-
victions.
On appeal, defense counsel argued that the trial court erred in not
giving a limiting instruction. The court of appeal affirmed due to the
defendant's failure to object to the absence of a limiting instruction or
to request a special instruction as required by Code of Criminal Procdure
articles 801 and 841. The supreme court granted writs and reversed.
Justice Dennis, writing for the court, concluded that Louisiana's multiple
offense procedures fail to comply with minimum due process standards
unless a contemporaneous limiting instruction is given whether requested
or not.
Justice Dennis noted that in Spencer v. Texas,'4 2 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the Texas procedure of offering evidence of both
the current offense and the prior convictions of similar crimes at the
guilt determination trial. The Texas procedure, however, required that
the jury be "charged that such matters were to be considered only for
the limited purpose of enhancement of punishment and not for deciding
guilt or innocence."'' 43 Justice Dennis concluded that: "It follows from
the high court's rationale that a recidivist procedure is unconstitutional,
when it allows evidence of defendant's past crimes ...during the guilt
determination trial, unless the procedure requires a jury instruction as
to the limited purpose of the prior crime evidence."'"
By describing the problem in terms of the facial unconstitutionality
of the statute (i.e., its failure to require the limiting instruction), Justice
Dennis avoided a direct confrontation with the contemporaneous ob-
jection rule which is solidly founded in the Code of Criminal Procedure
and the jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice Dennis, writing for the court in
139. La. R.S. 14:67 (1986) makes the offense of theft a felony (even if the value of
the stolen thing is less than one hundred dollars) "[i]f the offender ...has been convicted
of theft two or more times."
140. Such prior convictions are treated as elements of third offense theft and must
be alleged in the indictment and proved to the jury. See State v. Bouzigard, 286 So. 2d
633 (La. 1973).
141. See supra note 140.
142. 385 U.S. 554, 87 S. Ct. 648 (1967).




State v. Thomas (on rehearing),'45 in affirming a conviction, went to
great lengths to disavow any doctrine of "plain error" in evaluating
unobjected to jury instructions which may be fundamentally erroneous.
Yet, this is clearly the problem in Green: the unobjected to failure to
give an appropriate instruction to the jury regarding the effect to be
given to the highly prejudicial evidence of prior convictions. Indeed
without such an instruction, as Justice Dennis brilliantly demonstrates,
there is a real danger that the fact finding may be unreliable.
In State v. Hamilton, 46 Justice Lemmon considered the possible
harmful effect of an unobjected to jury instruction which violated the
constitutional principles enunciated in Sandstrom v. Montana. 47 The
jury was improperly instructed without objection that "[t]he law holds
that a sane person is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his own deliberate act."'4 The jury returned a capital
verdict and condemned the defendant to death.
Appellate defense counsel, despite the lack of trial objection, argued
for reversal of the first degree murder conviction. Rather than refusing
to consider the error due to trial counsel's procedural default, Justice
Lemmon thoroughly analyzed the possible prejudicial effects of the
instructions and concluded that the error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in light of the evidence, the factual issues presented, and
the other jury instructions. Thus, the conviction was affirmed.
In footnote seven, Justice Lemmon justified reviewing the error even
in the absence of a contemporaneous objection in a capital case "in
order to determine whether the error 'render[ed] the result unreliable,'
thus avoiding later consideration of the error in the context of ineffective
assistance of counsel."'' 49 He cited Washington v. Strickland,50 the United
145. 427 So. 2d 428 (La. 1983).
146. 478 So. 2d 123 (La. 1985).
147. 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979).
148. 478 So. 2d at 127 (emphasis omitted). Such an instruction has the effect of
relieving the state of proving "specific intent" beyond a reasonable doubt by purporting
to create a "presumption of intent." See also Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985).
149. 478 So. 2d at 127.
150. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct.
2574, 2586-87 (1986), the Court described the "Strickland" test as follows:
In order to establish ineffective representation, the defendant must prove both
incompetence and prejudice .... There is a strong presumption that counsel's
performance falls within the "wide range of professional assistance" .... IT]he
defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation was un-
reasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action
was not sound strategy .... The reasonableness of counsel's performance is
to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and
in light of all the circumstances and the standard of review is highly deferen-
tial .... The defendant shows that he was prejudiced by his attorney's inef-
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States Supreme Court opinion setting forth the standard for review of
such claims.
In Smith v. Murray5' and Murray v. Carrier,' the United States
Supreme Court dealt with application of the "cause and prejudice"
standard for federal review of constitutional claims despite procedural
defaults in state courts.'53 The Court outlined the relationship between
competency of counsel and "cause" for relieving the defendant of his
lawyer's failure to take the proper steps required by state law to preserve
an error for review. If counsel is otherwise competent, "the mere fact
that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim,
or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute
cause for a procedural default,"' 54 so long as counsel's performance is
not "constitutionally 'ineffective." On the other hand, "if the procedural
default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amend-
ment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the
State.""' 5 Thus, the Court concluded that "ineffective assistance" is
cause requiring post conviction collateral review of the error despite the
procedural defaults of defense counsel.' 56
fectiveness by demonstrating that "there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." . . . (Where a defendant challenges his conviction, he must
show that there exists "a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"). And, in de-
terming the existence vel non of prejudice, the court "must consider the totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury."
(citations omitted).
151. 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986).
152. 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986).
153. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977); Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982). In Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2644 (1986),
the Court described the Sykes "cause and prejudice" test as follows:
Wainwright v. Sykes held that a federal habeas petitioner who has failed to
comply with a State's contemporaneous-objection rule at trial must show cause
for the procedural default and prejudice attributable thereto in order to obtain
review of his defaulted constitutional claim . . . . In so holding, the Court
explicitly rejected the standard described in Fay v. Noia, . . . under which a
federal habeas court could refuse to review a defaulted claim only if "an
applicant hald] deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts,"
... by personal waiver of the claim amounting to 'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' . . . At a minimum, then,
Wainwright v. Sykes plainly implied that default of a constitutional claim by
counsel pursuant to a trial strategy or tactical decision would, absent extraor-
dinary circumstances, bind the habeas petitioner even if he had not personally
waived that claim . . . . Beyond that, the Court left open "for resolution in
future decisions the precise definition of the 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard."
154. Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. at 2645.
155. Id. at 2646.
156. The court in Murray said:
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The writer encourages the Louisiana Supreme Court to follow Justice
Lemmon's suggestion in his Hamilton footnote in all cases, not simply
capital cases. Jury instructions which are "constitutionally erroneous"
and which may cause a jury to render an "unreliable" verdict should
be reviewed on direct appeal despite the absence of a contemporaneous
objection. This procedure is much more efficient than to relegate the
defendant to post conviction proceedings." 7 This view also comports
with the philosophy that our justice system should not tolerate convic-
tions based on fundamentally unreliable fact finding procedures.
Evaluated in light of the "unreliable result" standard set forth in
the Hamilton footnote, Justice Dennis' opinion in Green would reach
the same result. Failure to give a limiting instruction which is vital to
the jury's adequate understanding of the role that the prior convictions
are to play in their guilt finding process is certainly the kind of error
which threatens the reliability of the fact finding and, hence, of the
verdict.
The thrust . . . of our decision in Engle is unmistakable: the mere fact that
counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to
raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural
default .... We think, then, that the question of cause for a procedural default
does not turn on whether counsel erred or on the kind of error counsel may
have made. So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance
is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland
v. Washington . . . we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of
attorney error that results in a procedural default. Instead, we think that the
existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the
prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Without attempting
an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a
procedural rule, we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a
claim was not reasonably available to counsel, . . . or that "some interference
by officials,"... . made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under
this standard.
Similarly, if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default
be imputed to the State, which may not "conduc[tl trials at which persons who
face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance."
• * * Ineffective assistance of counsel, then, is cause for a procedural default.
106 S. Ct. at 2645-47. (citations omitted).
157. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 924 and following. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
19861

